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The costs of resolving disputes through ordinary litigation are
significant, and the real costs of litigation are often more than pe-
cuniary. Parties frequently emerge from a lawsuit drained emo-
tionally and financially; frustrated with the length of time it takes
to decide a claim, the costs involved, the ponderous procedure; and
confused about what the results are supposed to be. The need for
conservation of judicial and attorney resources is also manifest.
While complementing the judicial system, arbitration provides a
workable solution outside the formal legal process, offering equita-
ble and accessible resolution of disputes.
This comment examines arbitration, not as a panacea for all
judicial ills, but as one alternative. It will explore the history of
arbitration, the Uniform Arbitration Act, the federal alternative
under the United States Arbitration Act, and the status of the law
in Montana. In showing that Montana law impedes the use of arbi-
tration, this comment will argue the advantages of arbitration as a
means of dispute resolution. Because lack of knowledge equates
with hostility, the procedure of arbitration will also be discussed.
II. THE NATURE OF ARBITRATION
Arbitration is the reference of a dispute to one or more impar-
tial persons for final and binding determination. It is private and
informal, designed for quick, practical, and inexpensive settle-
ments.' But at the same time, arbitration is an orderly proceeding,
governed by rules of procedure and standards of conduct pre-
scribed by law.2
"Arbitration is a creature of contract. The powers of the arbi-
trators are defined by the contract providing for arbitration and
little else."3 Where there is a broad provision for arbitration, the
Uniform Arbitration Act4 "and most state arbitration statutes em-
1. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, A COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION GUIDE (1979).
2. Id. at 2.
3. Kreindler, Write Your Own Remedy, 10 LITIGATION 31 (1983).
4. Promulgated by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1955,
the Uniform Arbitration Act has been enacted in 26 states. The general advantage of the
UAA is that it endows agreements to'arbitrate with the same legal protections that other
1
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power the arbitrators to grant virtually any relief or fashion any
remedy they deem equitable, even though a court would not grant
the relief."'
Arbitration is distinguishable from other forms of alternative
dispute resolution. Arbitration "modifies the traditional, adver-
sarial process of litigation but incorporates substantially the same
operating assumptions of the adversarial process."'6 Arbitration is
not mediation, a process in which a neutral intervenor assists nego-
tiating parties in reaching mutually acceptable terms of settle-
ment.7 It is not fact-finding, a process in which a neutral inter-
venor conducts a hearing regarding the circumstances which led to
the impasse between the negotiating parties;' nor is it facilitation,
a process in which a neutral intervenor manages the discussion
process.9
[Arbitration does] not tamper with the governing assumption of
the adversarial process: that an advocate is responsible for sepa-
rately marshalling pertinent evidence, presenting the case in the
light most favorable to her client's outcome, and ultimately con-
vincing the third-party decision-maker that her client's claim
should prevail over that of the opponent.10
An arbitration proceeding, while similar to a lawsuit in some
respects, is different in others. The proceeding takes place in a fo-
rum selected by the parties in lieu of a court of justice. The object
is to avoid what some feel to be the formalities, the delay, the ex-
pense, and the vexation of ordinary litigation.11 Arbitration de-
pends for its existence and for its jurisdiction upon the parties'
contract and upon the arbitration statute.
1 2
An arbitration hearing is not a trial. Under the Uniform Arbi-
tration Act [UAA],'s parties have the right to present material evi-
dence, cross-examine witnesses and be represented by a lawyer.
The arbitrator has the authority to subpoena documents and wit-
legitimate private agreements have.
5. Kreindler, supra note 3.
6. Stulberg, Negotiation Concepts and Advocacy Skills: The ADR Challenge, 48 ALB.
L. REV. 719, 720 (1984).
7. Id. at 721. Mediation is an advisory function, whereas arbitration is a judicial func-
tion. Mediation recommends, arbitration decides.
8. Id. The decision of the referee does not determine the issue but only constitutes a
report on the facts.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 720.
11. Cook, A Quest for Justice: Effective and Efficient Alternative Dispute Resolution
Processes, 1983 DET. C.L. REV. 1129, 1129-31.
12. Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d 892 (1967).
13. UNIF. ARBITRATION AcT, 7 U.L.A. 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as UAA].
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nesses, but otherwise the court rules of procedure and evidence
generally do not apply. 14 "The arbitrator is restrained only from
giving undue weight to hearsay evidence, and improper or insub-
stantial evidence. ' ' 15 "Arbitration is basically designed to be an in-
formal hearing where the decision-maker listens to all the evidence
bearing on the dispute and makes a decision which serves as an
expeditious and final resolution of the matter."' 6
III. THE HISTORY OF ARBITRATION
While arbitration was not historically favored at common law,
it was in use many centuries before the beginning of English com-
mon law.17 Indeed, one court has called arbitration "the oldest
known method of settlement of disputes between men.' 8 The
courts' reluctance to lend their authority to the enforcement of ar-
bitration clauses was due in part to the fact that such an agree-
ment tends to circumvent the court's jurisdiction. When parties
agreed to arbitrate, they by-passed the court system, an act which
the courts did not want to encourage. Consequently, arbitration
clauses were almost universally held to be void and
unenforceable. 9
At common law, courts recognized, but did not necessarily en-
force, three distinct types of arbitration provisions:20
(a) An agreement to arbitrate an existing dispute. This was en-
forceable only upon the completion of arbitration; parties were
denied court orders to enforce the contractual obligation to
arbitrate.2
(b) An agreement to arbitrate a future factual dispute. Courts
would enforce these provisions because they were not ousted of
their jurisdiction over questions of law.2"
(c) An agreement to arbitrate any future dispute. These agree-
ments were uniformly held to be void and unenforceable because
the courts were ousted of their jurisdiction and it was believed
14. Id. at 44.
15. F. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 254 (1973).
16. MacLean, Voluntary Arbitration as an Alternative to Litigation, 10 COLO. LAW.
1300, 1302 (1981).
17. Murray, Arbitration in the Anglo-Saxon and Early Norman Periods, 16 ARa. J.
193, 194 (1961).
18. McAmis v. Panhandle Pipe Line Co., 23 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 570, 574 (1954) (Sperry,
Arb.).
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that the parties should not be deprived of their access to the
courts.2 s
The validity of the arbitration agreement is not affected by
the hostility of the law, but at common law, an arbitration agree-
ment is revocable at will by each party any time before the award
is rendered. As a result, arbitration agreements at common law
mean very little because they are not subject to specific
enforcement."'
Lawyers, too, are reluctant to consider the use of arbitration.
This may be because their training in the adversarial system tends
to lead them directly from the dispute to court. In law school, stu-
dents are constantly reminded that the adversary process provides
the foundation for our legal system. Lawyers also frequently "be-
lieve that anything less than full exercise of the procedural rights
provided by the judicial process affords the client less than full and
complete protection."25 Finally, a basic lack of familiarity with the
arbitration process makes many lawyers unreceptive.
In 1925, the United States Congress enacted the United States
Arbitration Act 26 [USAA] to deliberately alter the judicial hostil-
ity. The report of the House Committee stated in part: "Arbitra-
tion agreements are purely matters of contract, and the effect of
the bill is simply to make the contracting party live up to his
agreement. He can no longer refuse to perform his contract when it
becomes disadvantageous to him.
'27
This trend toward arbitration has not waned. Chief Justice
Warren Burger in his 1.982 annual address to the American Bar
Association told lawyers that they must consider "moving some
cases from the adversary system to administrative processes," con-
centrating on arbitration as "one example of a better way to do
it."'2 8 The country's exploding litigation crisis demands alternatives
to judicial resolution of disputes. 9 Burger said both lawyers and
judges have been at fault for underuse of arbitration, judges "fear-
ing that it would deprive them of their jurisdiction" and lawyers
"mistakenly fearing that arbitration would adversely affect their
practice." 30
23. Id.
24. S.M. Wolff Co. v. Tulkoff, 9 N.Y.2d 356, 214 N.Y.S.2d 374, 377 (1961).
25. MacLean, supra note 16, at 1302.
26. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982) [hereinafter cited as USAA].
27. Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir.
1942) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924)).
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Forty-two states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico
enforce at least some form of agreement to arbitrate future dis-
putes.3 1 In the twenty-six states which have adopted the UAA,
3 2
"the subject matter of an arbitration agreement is virtually unlim-
ited, except when the contract itself might be unenforceable under
special statutes or public policies." s3 In some other states, includ-
ing some otherwise hospitable to arbitration, certain categories are
excluded from arbitration.3 '
A number of states 5 have enacted compulsory arbitration
statutes. Compulsory arbitration comes about when the legislature
declares that certain controversies must be resolved by arbitration.
In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, for instance, arbitration is
compulsory in civil cases when money damages are not in excess of
$50,000 or the action is on a negotiable instrument or contract. 31 In
Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn,37 the court upheld the constitutionality
of the arbitration rule. The court held that compulsory arbitration
with a right to demand trial de novo after an arbitration award did
not violate the seventh amendment right of trial by jury and did
not violate the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal
protection.
3 8
Most commercial arbitration is governed by the USAA, which
applies to all transactions involving commerce or admiralty.39 Con-
gress, in mandating the enforcement of arbitration agreements, has
expressed a national policy in favor of arbitration. This national
policy has gone so far as to withdraw from states the power to re-
quire judicial resolution of disputes.'0 In Southland Corp. v. Keat-
ing,"' the United States Supreme Court held that the USAA pre-
31. G. GOLDBERG, A LAWYER'S GUIDE To COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 6-7 (1983).
32. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, South Da-
kota, Tennessee, Texas, Wyoming.
33. GOLDBERG, supra note 31, at 7. Illegality of a contract may render an arbitration
clause unenforceable.
34. Port Washington Union Free School Dist. v. Port Washington Teachers Ass'n, 45
N.Y.2d 411, 380 N.E.2d 280, 408 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1978); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36 (1974).
35. Alabama, for example, has compulsory arbitration in areas of certain real estate
leases and school district annexation disputes. See ALA. CODE § 16-8-21 (Supp. 1984). Con-
necticut, California, and Pennsylvania have also passed compulsory arbitration programs.
36. Broderick, Compulsory Arbitration: One Better Way, 69 A.B.A.J. 64 (1983).
37. 478 F. Supp. 566 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
38. Id.
39. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
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empted a California statute requiring judicial consideration of
claims brought under that statute. The USAA, resting on Con-
gress' authority under the commerce clause, creates a body of fed-
eral substantive law that is applicable in both state and federal
courts.42
The Southland Court interpreted the language of the Federal
Act to go beyond the notion of application strictly to interstate
commerce. Indeed, as the Court noted:
Since the overwhelming proportion of civil litigation in this coun-
try is in the state courts, Congress could not have intended to
limit the Arbitration Act to disputes subject only to federal court
jurisdiction. In creating a substantive rule applicable in state as
well as federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legisla-
tive attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration
agreements.
43
Under the USAA, the only issue that may be decided by a
court is whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists. "If it exists,
all other issues, even a claim that the contract containing the arbi-
tration clause was induced by fraud, are for the arbitrators to de-
termine."4 4 When commerce or admiralty is involved, "an arbitra-
tion agreement will be enforceable even in a state whose laws
disapprove of arbitration. ' 45 Restrictive state statutes also will be
invalid. 6 If the underlying transaction does not involve commerce
or admiralty, the federal courts must apply the law of the forum
state."7
42. Id. at 854.
43. Id. at 860-61.
44. GOLDBERG, supra note 31, at 12; Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 395 (1967); Griffin v. Semperit of Am., Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D. Tex. 1976);
this is also the law in some states, e.g., Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am.,
37 N.Y.2d 91, 332 N.E.2d 333, 371 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1975), but not all states, e.g., Atcas v.
Credit Clearing Corp. of Am., 292 Minn. 334, 197 N.W.2d 448 (1972).
45. GOLDBERG, supra note 31, at 12; C.P. Robinson Constr. Co. v. National Corp. for
Hous. Partnership, 375 F. Supp. 446 (M.D.N.C. 1974); Network Cinema Corp. v. Glassburn,
357 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Austin v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 615
(M.D. Fla. 1972).
46. Medical Dev. Corp. v. Industrial Molding Corp., 479 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1973);
Cooper v. Computer Credit Sys., Inc., 40 A.D.2d 692, 336 N.Y.S.2d 380 (1972); Aerojet-
General Corp. v. Non-Ferrous Metal Ref., Ltd., 37 A.D.2d 531, 322 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1971);
Mamlin v. Susan Thomas, Inc., 490 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
47. Erie v. Tompkins 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., Inc.,
350 U.S. 198 (1956); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487 (1941);
O'Meara v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 230 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
[Vol. 46
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IV. ARBITRATION IN MONTANA
In light of Southland v. Keating,4 8 Montana's anti-arbitration
statute4 9 may very well be a violation of the supremacy clause and
hence, invalid. Unlike the overwhelming majority of states, Mon-
tana does not allow parties to arbitrate future disputes of law.
Montana Code Annotated provides in part that "persons capable
of contracting may submit to arbitration any controversy which
might be the subject of a civil action between them except a ques-
tion of title to real property in fee or for life." 50 In interpreting this
statute, the Montana court provided for judicial enforcement of an
arbitration provision only when the dispute is in existence at the
time the agreement is entered.5 1 Thus, only an agreement to arbi-
trate an existing dispute is valid and enforceable.
The common law validity of an agreement to arbitrate any fu-
ture factual dispute has also been recognized by the Montana
court.52 These provisions are considered valid because the courts
are not ousted of their jurisdiction over issues of law. Parties can
then agree to submit any factual controversy arising between them
to arbitration.53 The Montana court has indicated that such a lim-
ited use of arbitration is not truly arbitration but merely judicial
recognition of commercial appraisal.
54
The impediment to arbitration of future disputes is found in
Montana Code Annotated which states: "Every stipulation or con-
dition in a contract by which any party thereto is restricted from
enforcing his rights under the contract by the usual proceedings in
the ordinary tribunals . . . is void."55 This statute has been inter-
preted by the Montana court to prohibit contract provisions
whereby the parties agree to arbitrate future disputes as to ques-
tions of law."
Due to the statutory nature of arbitration in Montana, case
law is accordingly scant. The court has consistently shown defer-
ence to legislative authority, voiding contractual provisions which
allow for arbitration of future contract disputes.57 Ironically, as
early as 1938, the court favored the settlement of disputes by arbi-
48. 104 S. Ct. 852 (1984).
49. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-708 (1983).
50. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-101 (1983).
51. Green v. Wolff, 140 Mont. 413, 423, 372 P.2d 427, 433 (1962).
52. Palmer Steel Structures v. Westech, Inc., 178 Mont. 347, 584 P.2d 152 (1978).
53. Corbett, supra note 19, at 5.
54. School Dist. No. 1 v. Globe Republic Ins. Co., 146 Mont. 208, 404 P.2d 889 (1965).
55. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-708 (1983).
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tration, 58 but was unable to give effect to parties' agreements to
arbitrate. It is manifestly clear that the court favors arbitration. In
Smith v. Zepp,59 the court recognized arbitration as perhaps "the
most speedy and economical means available to parties for a bind-
ing resolution of their disputes."' 0
V. ADVANTAGES OF ARBITRATION
Because Montana law severely restricts the use of arbitration
for the resolution of disputes, parties may not take advantage of
what may be "the most speedy and economical means available."
Given the progressive increase in case filings on the district court
level in Montana, it would seem appropriate to exhaust other ave-
nues of resolution such as arbitration. 1
The advantages of arbitration are many. The parties can select
arbitrators who are familiar with the practices and customs of the
trade and with such matters as current prices, merchantable qual-
ity, and terms of sale.2 This feature of arbitration cannot help but
produce advantages both to the parties and to the public. The par-
ties benefit because there is no need to spend valuable time ac-
quainting a judge and jury with the background, customs, and us-
age and technical intricacies of an industry.63 The public benefits
because there is no need to appropriate funds for the support of
such a tribunal. 4 In fact, arbitration costs taxpayers nothing.
Further impetus for arbitration stems from the fact that the
judicial process is often an inappropriate forum for resolving a
number of disputes.6 5 "The highly repetitive and routine task in-
volving application of established principles to a large number of
individual cases" could be handled by a speedier and less cumber-
some procedure than litigation. When an issue has been fairly
well confined by a contract between the parties, by governing legis-
lation, or by a prior court decision, parties need to give arbitration
stronger consideration.6 7 Specialized issues also are handled effec-
tively through arbitration.
The economics of litigation are such that the amount in con-
58. McIntosh v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 106 Mont. 434, 78 P.2d 82 (1938).
59. 173 Mont. at 369, 567 P.2d at 929.
60. Id.
61. Haswell, The State of the Judiciary, 6 MONT. LAW. 8 (February 1981).
62. D. BLOOMFIELD, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION Xiii (1927).
63. Id. at xiii-xviii.
64. Id.
65. MacLean, supra note 16, at 1301.
66. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 79, 118-19 (1976).
67. Id. at 128.
206 [Vol. 46
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troversy may in reality disqualify many disputes from the judicial
process.68 Even if the amount in controversy is high, the costs of
litigation may still be prohibitive if extensive discovery is re-
quired."e By contrast, the costs of arbitration are usually substan-
tially less than the costs of a fully litigated case. If the arbitration
is administered by the American Arbitration Association [AAA] 70
a sliding scale is used.7 ' Fees for private arbitrators usually range
from $200 to $500 per day, including time spent in pre-hearing
conferences, in researching, and in writing the decision. 2
In Montana courts, cases take from one to three years to reach
trial. Complex litigation typically takes longer because of the ex-
tent of the discovery involved. Most litigated cases take at least a
week and not uncommonly longer to try. "The personnel commit-
ment, which is essential for this kind of trial, and especially the
breadth and depth of the preparation, represents a huge demand
and enormous drain on parties' time and energy. '73 An arbitration
hearing, on the other hand, can be completed in two days. The
average hearing is scheduled for a half day. 4
Arbitration provides the confidentiality that the normal judi-
cial process cannot. When adverse parties accede to an arbitration
hearing, they need not resort to any official judicial program for
resolution of their disputes.7 5 Attendance by the press is hardly
likely; in fact, parties can arbitrate in almost complete secrecy,
68. MacLean, supra note 16, at 1304.
69. Id.
70. The American Arbitration Association [hereinafter cited as AAA] is a private non-
profit association which was organized in 1926 under the New York Membership Corpora-
tion Law. It operates 25 regional offices in 18 states: Arizona (Phoenix); California (Los
Angeles, San Diego, San Francisco); Colorado (Denver); Connecticut (Hartford); District of
Columbia; Florida (Miami); Georgia (Atlanta); Illinois (Chicago); Massachusetts (Boston);
Michigan (Detroit); Minnesota (Minneapolis); North Carolina (Charlotte); New Jersey
(Somerset); New York (Garden City, New York City, Syracuse, White Plains); Ohio (Cincin-
nati, Cleveland); Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, Pittsburgh); Texas (Dallas); Washington (Se-
attle). The AAA will provide for administration of arbitrations conducted under its rules
anywhere in the United States.
71. The administrative fee of the AAA is based upon the amount of each claim and
counterclaim as disclosed when the claim and counterclaim are filed. If the amount is be-
tween $1-$20,000, the fee is 3% (minimum $200); $20,000-$40,000, the fee is $600, plus 2%
of excess over $20,000; $40,000-$80,000, the fee is $1000, plus 1% of excess over $40,000. See
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES 17 (1984).
72. Broderick, supra note 36, at 65.
73. Morris, Recent Developments in Alternative Forms of Dispute Resolution, 100
F.R.D. 499, 520-21 (1983).
74. Based on the arbitration process typically used in the leasing industry, hearings
are scheduled for a half day. Parties are not limited to that amount of time if the arbitrator
finds it necessary to extend the hearing. Interview with Elizabeth Reichelt, Arbitration Co-
ordinator for IFG Leasing Company, in Great Falls, Montana (Aug. 8, 1984).
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which is appealing to litigants in a messy or embarrassing dispute.
All that must be made public is the award that results from the
arbitration hearing.76 Generally there is no record of the hearing,
and the arbitrator's decision is not published."
When differences arise out of day-to-day commercial affairs,
parties often prefer to settle them privately and informally. 78 Nor-
mally, the employment of arbitration more readily accommodates
an ongoing business relationship. The dampening effect of virtual
warfare that may develop during litigation is avoided; the end re-
sult is likely to be no different than at law.79
Public dissatisfaction with the formal adversarial process often
makes arbitration an attractive option. Commentators argue that
we have "overjudicialized" the system, with concomitant adverse
effects on its efficiency as well as its accessibility to powerless liti-
gants.80 Accessibility to "justice" is no longer available to everyone;
cost, time, and frustration with the end result restrict many from
redress in court. The active individual participation characteristic
of arbitration, however, tends to give parties a greater role in
achieving justice.8 1 Because parties select the arbitrator, they
rarely criticize a decision rendered by her.2 Furthermore, parties
can set forth substantive legal rules in their contract, thus giving
them control over the governing principles as well as the process.8
VI. PROCESS
A decision to arbitrate is a decision to have the case heard and
decided on its merits, rather than on procedural matters.8 4 The
parties agree to abandon the formal judicial process and all the
procedural defenses relating to jurisdiction, notice, timeliness, ade-
quacy of the pleadings, motions for summary judgment and the
like.8
5
When a dispute arises under an agreement providing for arbi-
tration, the complaining party initiates the arbitration process by
76. M. DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 29:06 (1984).
77. Knight, Private Judging, 56 CAL. ST. B.J. 108 (1981).
78. AAA, supra note 1, at 2.
79. Sander, supra note 66, at 120.
80. Rosenberg, Devising Procedures That are Civil to Promote Justice That is Civi-
lized, 69 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1971).
81. Max, Arbitration-The Alternative to Timely, Costly Litigation, 42 ALA. LAW. 311
(1981).
82. MacLean, supra note 16, at 1306.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1305, 1306.
85. Id. at 1306.
[Vol. 46208
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serving notice to the other party of its demand for arbitration. A
demand for arbitration includes the names of the parties, the arbi-
tration clause upon which it is based, the nature of the dispute,
and the relief sought.8 6 As in the commencement of a court action,
service is crucial.
8 7
Parties may file an answering statement to the demand, but it
is not necessary to a party's case. Under the Commercial Arbitra-
tion Rules of the AAA, failure to answer will be considered a denial
of the claim.88 If the arbitration is conducted under the AAA rules,
the party must file its answer within seven days after notice.8 9 It is
sometimes advantageous to answer so as to apprise the arbitrator
of the respondent's position since otherwise the arbitrator will see
only the claimant's presentation.
Counterclaims must also be asserted in a timely fashion. In
the same manner as a demand, the counterclaim must contain a
statement setting forth the nature of the counterclaim; the amount
involved, if any; and the remedy sought.90 While parties frequently
submit counterclaims as an attempt to offset an award, AAA re-
ports indicate that arbitrators grant offsets in only ten percent of
the cases. 1
The arbitration locale can be set forth in the contract, stipu-
lated to by the parties, or designated by the arbitrator. In practice,
mutually acceptable arrangements are made through consultations
by the arbitrator with the parties or by the agency administering
the arbitration. Notice of the hearing must be given by proper ser-
vice since the confirmation of an award against a nonparticipating
party will depend, among other factors, upon the proper service of
the notice of hearing.
92
86. Del Bianco & Assoc. Inc. v. Adam, 6 Ill. App. 3d 286, 285 N.E.2d 480 (1972). "The
demand must state the specific nature of the existing controversy to be arbitrated." Nager
Elec. Co. v. Weisman Constr. Corp., 29 A.D.2d 939, 289 N.Y.S.2d 473 (1968); P.J. Carlin
Constr. Co. v. Rockland County ex rel. Rockland Community College, 63 A.D.2d 702, 404
N.Y.S.2d 697 (1978).
87. Service by certified mail, return receipt requested, is the usual procedure, although
the claimant may have to ask the sheriff to serve the demand. See AAA, COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION RULES § 40 at 13 (1984). Obviously, service by mail offers great convenience in
terms of time and money. The use of the postal system to serve demands has judicial ap-
proval. In Mulcahy v. Whitehill, 48 F. Supp. 917 (D. Mass. 1943), an award rendered ex
parte in New York in favor of an Argentine firm was enforced against the debtor in Boston.
The district court deemed the agreement to arbitrate under AAA rules sufficient consent to
service by mail within or without the state where the arbitration was held.
88. AAA, COMMERcIAL ARBITRATION RULES § 7 (1984).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. DOMKE, supra note 76, at § 14:05.
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The form of the arbitration proceedings depends essentially
upon the agreement of the parties. Normally, the parties refer to
the arbitration rules of an administering agency which will provide
for the proper conduct of the proceedings." In the absence of
guidelines, the arbitrator must, at the very least, observe certain
standards of fairness. Montana Code Annotated provides that the
arbitrator must swear to "faithfully and fairly hear and examine
the allegations and evidence." 94
An oral hearing allows both parties to present their case before
the arbitrator and to object to the arguments presented by the
other side. 5 However, hearings may not be specifically required
under the rules applicable to arbitration." Both parties may waive
oral hearings or the production of oral testimony, retaining the
right to reply and comment on any document submitted to the ar-
bitrator.9 7 This is seldom done, however, since an oral discussion of
issues is normally crucial.
The usual common law rules pertaining to the admission and
rejection of evidence are not strictly applied in arbitration.", In a
normal arbitration, very little evidence will be excluded. Arbitra-
tion is not intended to be conducted as formally as a judicial pro-
ceeding; thus, arbitrators have discretionary power to admit and
hear any evidence that the parties may wish to present.9 9 Techni-
cal objections are rarely heard. Good arbitrators, however, and es-
pecially ones who are attorneys, normally give less weight to evi-
dence that would not be admissible in ordinary court procedures.
Arbitrators can question a witness themselves or request a
party's attorney to produce additional evidence.0 0 An arbitrator
can also refuse to hear a witness named by the party. In Hopkins
School Dist. No. 40, 133 Mont. 530, 327 P.2d 395 (1958).
93. For example, the parties' arbitration clause may state: "Any controversy or claim
arising out of or relating to this contract, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitra-
tion in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration
Association."
94. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-201 (1983).
95. See AAA, supra note 88, § 29. In the absence of special rules on the conduct of
arbitration proceedings, such conduct is governed by the applicable provisions of general
arbitration statutes. Marsala v. Valve Corp. of Am., 157 Conn. 362, 254 A.2d 469 (1969).
96. In re Thaler, 135 N.Y.S.2d 532, 534 (1954).
97. For a practical summary of the usual procedure in an arbitration hearing, see R.
COULSON, BUSINESS ARBITRATION-WHAT You NEED TO KNOW 23-24 (2d ed. 1982).
98. M. HILL, EVIDENCE IN ARBITRATION 1 (1980).
99. Frantz v. Inter-Insurance Exchange of Auto. Club of So. Cal., 229 Cal. App. 2d
269, 40 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1964); Coulson, Appropriate Procedures for Receiving Proof in Com-
mercial Arbitration, 71 DICK. L. REV. 63, 73 (1966).
100. Hill, supra note 98, at 143.
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v. School District No. 40,°10 the court held that such refusal did
not amount to misconduct of the arbitrator when "there [was] no
showing . ..that [the party] would have offered any evidence in
addition to what the arbitrators actually received, or what was ad-
duced before the arbitrators. '" 10 ' Often when an arbitrator is spe-
cifically chosen for her knowledge and expertise, her discretion in
receiving evidence is significant. There is danger, however, that she
may consider her own method to be the only correct one.
The arbitration statutes of forty-two states, the District of Co-
lumbia, and Puerto Rico give the arbitrator power to issue subpoe-
nas to compel the appearance of witnesses and for the production
of documents.10 3 The USAA provides that the arbitrator may issue
subpoenas if the evidence sought is material to the proceedings;
this standard is generally accepted in state law. 04 In the practice
of arbitration, however, arbitrators issue relatively few
subpoenas."°5
While under Montana law"°6 arbitrators have the power to ad-
minister oaths to witnesses, witnesses generally do not have to be
sworn. 101 Many times witnesses are sworn to show the witness the
importance of her testimony. This may be even more important
because of the informality of arbitration procedure which should
otherwise prevail.
The UAA, USAA, and the state statutes all are silent on the
use of law by arbitrators to determine the issues presented. Some
arbitration clauses contain reference to either the law to be applied
by the arbitrator or to the place of arbitration from which the par-
ties' intention with respect to the law to be applied might be
gleaned. 1 8 Freedom from a "strict" application of law is not, how-
ever, "disregarding the law." Arbitrators are carefully briefed by
each opposing lawyer as to the applicable law. At the same time,
attorneys argue the equitable and practical considerations that
should be weighed by the arbitrator. An arbitrator does have the
freedom of determining disputes according to her sense of justice,
but arbitrators do not favor disregarding substantive law.'0 9
101. 133 Mont. 530, 327 P.2d 395 (1958).
102. Id. at 535, 327 P.2d at 398.
103. UAA § 7 (1978). AAA, supra note 88, § 31. The Montana statutes do not provide
the arbitrator with subpoena power.
104. USAA § 7; 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1982).
105. Domke, supra note 76, § 24:03.
106. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-202 (1983).
107. Locklear v. Payne, 124 Ga. App. 845, 186 S.E.2d 439 (1971).
108. DOMKE, supra note 76, §§ 25:02-25:05.
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It is often said that parties do not expect arbitrators to make
their decision according to rules. Rather, especially when the arbi-
trators are not lawyers, parties expect decisions to be based on ex-
perience, knowledge of the customs of the trade, and fair and good
sense.
110
The award is the final decision of the arbitrator in the settle-
ment of a controversy. Procedurally, the award must comply with
certain formalities."' To qualify as a binding award, the findings
of the arbitrator must result in a decision on the merits of the con-
troversy." 2 An arbitrator's decision only has the effect of resolving
the dispute submitted for arbitration. The conclusions of law and
findings of fact reached by the arbitrator, while binding on the
parties, have no effect as precedent in other similar disputes." 3
Thus, an appealing factor in some instances of arbitration is the
resolution of the dispute without a binding interpretation of the
law.
1 14
Arbitration does not limit one's selection of remedies. Typi-
cally, the remedy available in court is limited by the pleadings or
the pre-trial order. An injunction may be granted or denied. Dam-
ages may or may not be awarded. On the other hand, parties may
enlist a whole host of alternatives following an arbitration. 1 5 Arbi-
trators under a broad contract provision can award either specific
performance or damages based on the interest of justice.'", Arbi-
trators frequently order specific performance because it is often
the more equitable determination. The solution available is limited
only by the parties' ingenuity. An imaginative lawyer can use an
arbitration agreement to fashion flexible remedies that would be
unavailable in court."
7
An arbitration award is a decision and not a settlement in the
sense of a compromise between the parties. An award must, on its
face, dispose of all issues raised by either party by demand or
110. S.A. Wenger & Co. v. Propper Silk Hosiery Mills, 239 N.Y. 199, 203, 146 N.E.
203, 204 (1924).
111. DOMKE, supra note 76, §§ 29:01-29:06.
112. Wilkins v. Allen, 169 N.Y. 494, 62 N.E. 575 (1902).
113. MacLean, supra note 16, at 1306.
114. Id.
115. Kreindler, supra note 3, at 31-32.
116. Id.
117. At law, specific performance of a sales contract is the exception, not the rule. But
do damages place the injured party in as good a position as the contract? The arbitrator's
remedies can solve deadlocks in a closed corporation or partnership; arbitrators can direct
dissolution of a corporation or direct the expulsion of a partner from the partnership. See In
re Berman, 31 Misc. 2d 830, 222 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1961); In re Steinberg, 32 N.Y.2d 671, 295
N.E.2d 795, 343 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1973).
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counterclaim.'1 8 The AAA's regular form of an award provides for
a statement by the arbitrators that they have "duly heard the
proofs and allegations of the parties."'1 9 The effect of such lan-
guage is to indicate that the arbitrator has fulfilled her functions.
Once an arbitrator has determined an award, court enforce-
ment of some type may need to be sought. 20 Through the use of
statutory provisions, parties can confirm an award and convert it
into a judgment. Under the UAA, an order confirming an award is
authorized to be entered and enforced as any other judgment or
decree. 21 This summary procedure eliminates the need to bring an
action on the award. The time limit for a party to apply to the
court for confirmation of an award ranges from one year to four
years. 122
Transforming an award into a judgment permits the use of the
regular judicial enforcement process to satisfy the award. The
USAA and the UAA both require that parties bringing any action
upon the award do so in the jurisdiction where the award was ren-
dered. 2 3 This is because a judgment cannot be entered upon an
award which does not comply with statutory arbitration
requirements.
24
When the application for confirmation is made, the opposing
party may set out grounds for vacating or modifying the award.
Generally, however, a separate motion to vacate or modify the
award is made within a shorter time period. 125 Judicial challenges
of an award are made pursuant to statutes which provide special
motions to vacate, modify, or resubmit the award to the same or
new arbitrators. 20 These motion procedures are more expeditious
than common law bases for such action.
127
118. In re Zephyr Constr. Co., 7 A.D.2d 915, 182 N.Y.S.2d 946 (1959).
119. Meer Corp. v. Farmella Trading Corp., 14 Misc.2d 242, 244, 178 N.Y.S.2d 784,
786 (1958).
120. Of course, parties may acquiesce in the award and voluntarily comply. Sandford
Laundry, Inc. v. Simon, 285 N.Y. 488, 35 N.E.2d 182 (1941).
121. UAA, supra note 13, § 14.
122. Under the USAA, the time limit for a party to apply to the court for confirmation
of an award is one year after the making of the award. The UAA does not specify a time
limit for confirmation of an award. Under California law, the time limit for confirmation is
four years. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1288 (West 1982).
123. UAA, supra note 13, §§ 12, 13; 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11 (1982).
124. DOMKE, supra note 76, § 37:03.
125. Parties sometimes prefer to challenge the award within the statutory time limit
(generally, three months) rather than wait until the other party attempts to have the award
confirmed. Lopez & Roque Tile Co., v. Clearwater Development Corp., 291 So.2d 126 (Fla.
App. 1974).
126. DOMKE, supra note 76, § 33:00.
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The statutory grounds for vacating an award are substantially
the same as at common law. Most statutes set out the grounds by
which a challenge of the award will be heard. Under both the UAA
and the USAA, grounds for vacating an award are as follows:
1. the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means;
2. there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them;
3. the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to post-
pone the hearing, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent or ma-
terial to the controversy, or any other misbehavior by which the
rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
4. the arbitrators exceeded their powers or so imperfectly exe-
cuted them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the sub-
ject matter was not made. 2'
These statutes also allow for a modification or correction of
the award where (a) there was an evident material miscalculation
or mistake; (b) an award was made upon a matter not submitted;
or (c) the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the
merits of the controversy.129 It is well-settled law under the deci-
sions of federal and state courts that an award may be challenged
only on the grounds which are specified in the statute. 30
VII. THE LAWYER'S PLACE IN ARBITRATION
Lawyers often mistakenly presume that arbitration is for non-
lawyers. 1 ' But, it is lawyers who insert arbitration clauses into the
contracts they draft and lawyers who appear regularly on behalf of
their clients in these tribunals. The role of the lawyer in arbitra-
tion is critically important. Since the purpose of the arbitration
hearing is to present all material evidence regarding the dispute,
both sides should be represented by counsel.
The first function of the lawyer then is to insure that all of the
facts relevant and favorable to the client's position are developed
and that they are presented in the most coherent, and persuasive
action for judgment on the award. The time limit fixed by statute for motions to vacate,
modify, or correct awards is usually 90 days. This brevity assures that any challenge will be
made promptly.
128. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)-(d) (1982); UAA § 12 (1978).
129. 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1982); UAA § 13 (1978).
130. San Martine Compania de Navegacion v. Saguenay Terminals, Ltd., 293 F.2d 796
(9th Cir. 1961); Hirt v, Hervey, 118 Ariz. 543, 578 P.2d 624 (1978); Moen v. State, 13 Wash.
App. 142, 533 P.2d 862 (1975).
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fashion possible. 132 Second, the lawyer must argue the client's posi-
tion based on the facts and the law. These functions in fact require
advocacy skills of the highest order. The task of arguing only the
merits of the case to the arbitrator presents different challenges
than arguing procedural technicalities, requiring the lawyer to fo-
cus more on substantive rather than procedural advocacy skills.'
Lawyers also play a crucial role as potential arbitrators. Since
lawyers are comfortable with the hearing process and can likely re-
ceive, consider, and weigh evidence more fairly, they are better
equipped to handle arbitration proceedings. Additionally, parties
can select an attorney who has specialized knowledge in the field of
the dispute.3 The AAA maintains a panel of arbitrators who are
qualified experts in their respective areas who remain available to
the Association when called upon.
35
VIII. CONCLUSION
Arbitration is not an all-or-nothing proposal. No one is sug-
gesting that litigation will or should disappear. But, arbitration has
proven to be an efficient and equitable method of resolving
claims.1
3 6
Montana law prevents willing parties from taking advantage of
arbitration as an alternative to the judicial process. The need for
this alternative is increasingly apparent. While Southland Corp. v.
Keating 37 may sanction commercial arbitration in Montana, legis-
lative action is necessary to allow arbitration of a variety of
conflicts.
132. MacLean, supra note 16, at 1308.
133. ELKOURI, supra note 15, at 20.
134. Friedman, Checklist for Commercial Arbitration, 37 ARB. J. 10 (1982).
135. Max, supra note 81, at 325.
136. Testa, supra note 75, at 60.
137. 104 S. Ct. 852 (1984). However, strictly intrastate commerce would still be gov-
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